

A JOINT FORCES GROUP: A PERMANENT JOINT ECHELON FOR THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

**A MONOGRAPH
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14. ABSTRACT

This paper investigates creating a deployable joint warfighting headquarters at the operational level of war called the Joint Forces Group. The paper is broken down into four chapters. The first, describes current joint doctrine on how the U.S. military organizes for war. The second, investigates the function of command and the development of modern military formations. The third, analyzes JTF operations and exercises from 1983 to 1994. The last chapter introduces the Joint Forces Group concept. The paper discusses the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. All three are essential to successfully prosecuting military operations. The requirement to link the strategic endstate and tactical means makes the operational level unique. Although, a CINC can do this, but he then operates at the operational level. The operational level is also unique because it relies on an ad hoc command structure to carry-out military operations; the Joint Task Force (JTF). History suggests that ad hoc structures are not the best way to employ military forces. Command is accomplished by a commander and his staff; they are a team that plans the way the mission is accomplished. Developing an effective team requires organizational stability, best achieved in permanent organizations. The development of modern military formations also suggests that permanent organizations are better than improvised ones. Specialization of arms led to the development of combined arms to provide the great flexibility. Service components represent the pinnacle of specialization of tactical forces; there is a need to better orchestrate these components. A review of JTF operations and exercises showed there were problems with planning attributable, in part, to an ad hoc headquarters. This did not lead to defeat or mission failure because the tasks were relatively simple and the enemy, in combat operations, was inferior. There is no guarantee that this will remain so. There were occasional recommendations that a permanent echelon would have been beneficial. The solution to those recommendations is the Joint Forces Group echelon. The JFG will be a deployable, permanent joint headquarters that can more effectively orchestrate joint forces. The JFG is feasible by taking advantage of the joint specialty officer and other changes in joint warfighting. It will use a streamlined staff structure to economize on manning levels. It represents the next step in improving joint warfighting.

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

The Joint Forces Group: A Permanent Joint Echelon for the Operational Level of War by MAJ Edward V. Weber, USAF, 59 pages.

This paper investigates creating a deployable joint warfighting headquarters at the operational level of war called the *Joint Forces Group*. The paper is broken down into four chapters. The first, describes current joint doctrine on how the U.S. military organizes for war. The second, investigates the function of command and the development of modern military formations. The third, analyzes JTF operations and exercises from 1983 to 1994. The last chapter introduces the Joint Forces Group concept.

The paper discusses the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. All three are essential to successfully prosecuting military operations. The requirement to link the strategic endstate and tactical means makes the operational level unique. Although, a CINC can do this, but he then operates at the operational level. The operational level is also unique because it relies on an *ad hoc* command structure to carry-out military operations; the Joint Task Force (JTF).

History suggests that *ad hoc* structures are not the best way to employ military forces. Command is accomplished by a commander and his staff; they are a team that *plans* the way the mission is accomplished. Developing an effective team requires organizational stability, best achieved in permanent organizations. The development of modern military formations also suggests that permanent organizations are better than improvised ones. Specialization of arms led to the development of combined arms to provide the great flexibility. Service components represent the pinnacle of specialization of tactical forces; there is a need to better orchestrate these components.

A review of JTF operations and exercises showed there were problems with planning attributable, in part, to an *ad hoc* headquarters. This did not lead to defeat or mission failure because the tasks were relatively simple and the enemy, in combat operations, was inferior. There is no guarantee that this will remain so. There were occasional recommendations that a permanent echelon would have been beneficial.

The solution to those recommendations is the *Joint Forces Group* echelon. The JFG will be a deployable, permanent joint headquarters that can more effectively orchestrate joint forces. The JFG is feasible by taking advantage of the joint specialty officer and other changes in joint warfighting. It will use a streamlined staff structure to economize on manning levels. It represents the next step in improving joint warfighting.

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INTRODUCTION

Everything in war is simple, but the simplest things are difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.¹

Friction in war is a concept first discussed by the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz in his book On War. Carl von Clausewitz said this concept pervades a military organization with each individual retaining “his potential of friction.” Clausewitz said that friction is caused by the nature of war, its “dangers” and the “physical exertions” it demands and cannot be measured.² Commanders require the “greatest skill and personal exertion, and the utmost presence of mind” in order to deal with friction’s effects.³ Only “the experienced officer will make the right decision” using a well developed instinct and tact for military operations. “Practice and experience dictate the answer: ‘this is possible, that is not’.”⁴

Minimizing friction is done by developing simple operational plans. Key to simple plans is an efficient and effective staff as well as the practiced and experienced commander. The commander and staff team are essential in designing operations that forces can execute with minimal friction. This requires learning how to work with one another; discovering strengths and weaknesses. Each military service practices this concept, but joint task forces (JTFs) specifically have a problem.⁵

By their *ad hoc* nature JTFs maximize friction instead of minimizing it. When a military contingency occurs a combatant commander has the option of creating a joint task force (JTF). While this gives the military much flexibility it violates the historical practice of having trained commanders and staffs existing before the war or crisis starts.⁶

The JTF commander and staff are new to each other and may be new to the concept of joint warfighting; they lack the practice and experience Clausewitz thought

essential to overcoming friction's effects. Becoming an effective and efficient JTF takes time, that may not be available in a crisis. At worse, an ineffective or inefficient JTF may create a plan that kills many people and loses the war. At best, it may miss opportunities to end the war with minimal or no combat and the attendant loss of life.⁷

Military history provides examples of creating military organizations capable of independent operations and made up of different types of forces. The creation of army corps in the Napoleonic period was a watershed in warfare because it gave birth to the operational level of war. The corps provided the ability to conduct independent operations within a common commanders endstate. It also reduced span of control problems that occurred with large forces. It brought together the combined arms of infantry, cavalry, and artillery; orchestrating them into winning combinations on the battlefield. The joint community is in need of this kind of organization to orchestrate *joint arms* on tomorrow's battlefields.

The advent of airpower has introduced the requirement to orchestrate air, ground, and naval forces towards a common endstate. Prior to this ground and naval operations were separate for the most part. The air weapon has broadened the complexity of applying means to military operations because it can be applied against ground, sea, as well as air forces.

The military services have senior tactical echelons such as army corps, Numbered Air Forces (NAFs), Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), and Naval Battle Groups that are able to conduct independent operations. These organizations have a trained commander and staff to plan and conduct military operations in their respective media; they are usually not created *ad hoc*.

This paper will investigate creating a deployable joint warfighting headquarters at the operational level of war. This new operational level echelon will be called the *Joint Forces Group (JFG)*. The Joint Forces Group would be commanded by a Lieutenant General with a staff comprised of joint service officers (JSOs). It would not have forces assigned to it in peacetime, but would draw from a pool of units much like the time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD). The JFG would still command service forces through component commands. The JFG would train on a yearly basis for various contingencies in the unified command it is assigned to. These contingencies would be based on different types of conflict from a humanitarian operation up to an including a major regional conflict. Wargames would be held every three months and be focused on potential crisis in a particular unified command's area of responsibility (AOR).⁸

The paper will first examine current joint doctrine to understand how the U.S. is organized to conduct military operations. Since World War II the progress towards truly joint warfare has been slow but steady progress. This progress has taken place mainly at the national and theater strategic level.

The function of command will then be examined to show the importance of the commander and his staff. The relationship between them is key in conducting military operations; weakness or inexperience in either may be costly in lives and materiel. In addition, the development of military formations will be analyzed. Although joint doctrine is based on the *collective experience* in warfare, it is flawed in that history points to *permanent* echelons or formations as the rule. In other words, improvised or *ad hoc* formations are not the "best way to employ forces."⁹

The history of joint task forces will be reviewed to see whether *ad hoc* joint headquarters interfered with the conduct of operations. Using the Joint Universal

Lessons Learned (JULLS) database and other sources the paper will attempt to determine if problems during JTF operations and exercises resulted from the JTF's *ad hoc* nature.

The paper will then describe the JFG concept. This will include how it is organized, how the commander and his staff are selected and trained, and how it will *fight*.

Because the U.S. military has drawn down it must become better at orchestrating joint forces. The army and the navy fought in U.S. wars as services up to World War II. During that war the U.S. adopted *joint* warfare to conduct military operations. In the last 50 years the military has made joint organizations more efficient and effective. The next step is to create a flexible *and* permanent joint warfighting headquarters for the operational level of war.

ORGANIZING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

In general, the system of employing troops is that the commander receives his mandate from the sovereign to mobilize the people and assemble the army.¹⁰
Sun Tzu

Current U.S. joint doctrine recognizes three *levels* of war: the strategic, operational, and tactical. They are "doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions."¹¹ Their boundaries are indistinct. The levels are independent of command level, unit size, force or equipment type, or particular component. They are defined more by what is achieved rather than what is done.¹²

The strategic level "is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational strategic security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives."¹³

The nation's political leadership creates national policy that is then turned into national strategic military objectives; becoming the foundation for theater strategic planning.

Theater strategy determines specific courses of action designed to achieve national objectives within a specific region. Theater strategy sets the stage for military operations within a theater of war. The conduct of those military operations fall within the operational level.¹⁴

The operational level “links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives.”¹⁵ This level of war is relatively new in military theory; first being recognized in the 1920s by military theorists such as A.A. Svechin and M.V. Tukhachevsky. Although what is now done at the operational level was previously done at the strategic level. As war became more complex during the Industrial Revolution the strategic level divide into two levels.¹⁶

The operational level uses operational art to determine “when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the enemy disposition before combat.”¹⁷ Operational art is the “use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.”¹⁸ Operational art ensures the efficient and effective use of weapons and people and “helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before battle” so unnecessary bloodshed is avoided.¹⁹ Its absence leads to “disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.”²⁰

In fact, operational art closely resembles what the military theorists Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine Jomini called *strategy*.²¹ Clausewitz said the strategist defines the “aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose.”²² The aim determines “the series of actions intended to achieve it: he will, in fact, shape the individual campaigns and, within these, decide on the individual

engagements.”²⁴ In today’s terms the operational artist does what the strategist did and therefore must be comfortable with, and sensitive to, the political nature of war; especially its ambiguity. Ambiguity exists because “strategy (operational art), policy, and statesmanship” begin to blend at the “highest realms of strategy” where “intellectual complications and extreme diversity of factors and relationships occur.”²⁵

An example from American history will demonstrate how politics and military action interact. During the American Revolution Britain’s Whig Party was against its continuation. Although Cornwallis had been defeated at Yorktown in 1781 the King was still willing to continue the war. However, the British defeat brought down the government under Lord North; the King’s ally. The King had to make a deal with the Whig Party to form a new Parliament. On March 14, 1781 the Whigs sent this reply to the King: “The King must not give a Veto to the independence of America.”²⁶

The above shows that both the victory at Yorktown *and* British politics was decisive. What happened is analogous to attacking an alliance of nations to induce an enemy to quit. It was an *internal* alliance within the British government itself that Yorktown attacked. Although the King could have continued the war and attempt to squeeze the young republic over time, he was forced by political circumstances to acquiesce.²⁷

Today the operational artist must consider the political ramifications of military operations. Since military action or the potential for military action serve a political end at some point an assessment has to be made on whether the strategic ends have been achieved. The assessment has to be made by a commander who has an understanding of the strategic end/objective *and* controls the force required to achieve those ends; a joint force commander (JFC).²⁸

As joint doctrine makes clear operational art involves “the design and implementation of leverage and knowing how and when to terminate a conflict.”²⁸ Operational art requires accepting that military operations are not designed for decisive defeat of the enemy or his military forces. A negotiated end to conflict can also achieve strategic objectives. The use or threat of use of military force can induce the enemy to negotiate an end to the conflict. U.S. experience in the Korean War bares this out. Although the strategic objective shifted from maintaining the status quo, to unification of north and south, and then back to the status quo, ultimately both sides had to negotiate an end to hostilities. Korea is also an example where the operational commander did not appreciate the political situation.²⁹

The operational artist must have a “broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and achieve effective “joint and multinational cooperation.”³⁰ Like the strategist of Clausewitz’ day the operational artist needs “great strength of character, great lucidity, and firmness of mind...in order to follow through steadily, to carry out the plan, and not be thrown off course by thousands of diversions.”³¹ Operational art requires the longer view and acceptance of guesses and presumptions; ambiguity arises causing the unprepared to doubt and become paralyzed.³²

In contrast the tactical level is where “execution is dominant,” “intellectual factors are reduced to a minimum,” and “one is carried away by the pressures of the moment, caught up in the maelstrom where resistance would be fatal, and suppressing incipient scruples, one presses boldly on.”³³ The tactical level is where battles and engagements actually occur. It “includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potential.”³⁴ Tactical forces are

trained, organized, and equipped, and employed to obtain outcomes that achieve strategic objectives.³⁵

Clausewitz said war is “a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”³⁶ Clausewitz continually reminds his reader, the would be strategist or tactician, that war is inextricably bound with politics. This concept is embodied in the U.S. Constitution; the President is Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces and all military personnel take a solemn oath to support and defend the Constitution.³⁷

The President’s chief representative for defense matters is the Secretary of Defense. Together these two constitute the National Command Authorities (NCA). The NCA is the ultimate source of authority for command and control of the U.S. military, and sets the policy for the military follows in peace and war.

Supporting the NCA are the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of unified commands. The JCS is comprised of the Service Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The Chairman is the principal advisor to the President on military matters, and the senior ranking officer in uniform. The Joint Staff supports the CJCS and acts as national strategic military staff; in effect the CJCS is the President’s *Chief of Staff*.³⁸

Command authority over military forces belongs to the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the nine unified commands. A unified command has a “broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components two or more Military Departments.”³⁹ Unified commands take two forms: geographical or functional. Geographical commands include “all associated land, water areas, and

airspace” and are called theaters. Functional commands are responsible for specific functions like transportation and provide necessary support to geographic CINCs.⁴⁰

Only the CINCs exercise the authority of combatant command (COCOM). The CINCs are the warfighters for the nation and report directly to the Secretary of Defense; military services provide the means CINCs use to achieve strategic ends.⁴¹

The CINCs “prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans” to accomplish their missions. The strategic estimate “results in operational concepts and courses of action.”⁴² Key to this process is defining the strategic end-state. It is clear that combatant commanders lie within the strategic level of war. A joint staff supports each CINC; it prepares operations plans that would be used to conduct military operations. The CINCs are also supported by service components that exercise control of tactical forces assigned to the CINC.⁴³

A CINC has a number of options to organize for the conflict during a crisis. These include taking direct command, forming a sub-unified command, forming a JTF, or using forces from a single service. This latter is typically reserved for small operations within the services capabilities, but joint doctrine assumes most operations will be joint.

The CINC may directly command the operation using his service components or creating functional components. The components make recommendations on employment of their forces, accomplishing assigned missions, and selecting specific units to be employed.⁴⁴

There are two problems with the CINC taking direct command of operations. First, his geographical area of responsibility is typically very large and multiple crises may occur. Direct command of multiple theaters of operations, separated by a thousand

miles or more, would increase risk and reduce effectiveness. At the CINC's level strategic concerns dominate the environment.

Second, the CINC often acts as a statesman, because his position and role spans a large region with many countries; some friendly and others less so. This is more prevalent during peace when the CINC has discussions with regional allies. During military operations his role as a statesman may interfere with the proper conduct of military operations in a specific theater. In fact he will be a vital factor in getting support from nations in his AOR for military operations. This is not to say that a CINC would never take direct charge; he should when the level of conflict encompasses most of his AOR.⁴⁵

To avoid the problem of direct command the CINC could create a sub-unified command. This may happen when the conflict is long-term and encompasses a significant geographical area. The sub-unified commander exercises operational control (OPCON) of assigned forces rather than COCOM. The major difference between COCOM and OPCON deals with controlling logistics, internal service matters, and subordinate joint force commanders. U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Alaskan Command are sub-unified commands. A sub-unified command has limitations. First, it is usually a long-term commitment in one specific location against one enemy. Second, it requires full-time forces because of the existing threat.⁴⁶

A third option is to form a JTF. A JTF is created "to accomplish missions with specific, limited objectives and which do not require overall centralized control of logistics."⁴⁷ JTF commanders exercise OPCON over assigned forces to conduct operations that are operational in nature. Once the mission is accomplished it is disestablished by the establishing authority.⁴⁸

The CINC has a number of choices available to form a JTF headquarters. He can use his own joint staff as the nucleus and put his deputy in command. He can use one of his components as the nucleus of the headquarters; this is typically how JTFs have been formed.

Using his own deputy and staff has its merits; familiarity with joint doctrine and procedures, and each other. However, the CINC loses key people who normally work regional issues; military strategic policy may suffer. In addition, the deputy and staff may not have practiced as a commander and staff, or only infrequently. Training also takes away time from peacetime jobs.

Using component commands has the advantage of an existing command and control capability; a commander, staff, and associated communications. Depending on the operation's size the full component may be used or one of its subordinate echelons. For example, EUCOM creates a "working group" that will be the JTF "precursor" during a crisis. This group analyzes and educates itself to gain knowledge of crisis. The JTF commander is chosen by the CINC in consultation with his deputy and component commanders. Selection criteria includes the nature of the impending operation and the individuals "special talents."⁴⁹ The JTF staff is selected from key members of the JTF commander's component staff augmented with EUCOM officers and other specialists. A senior member of the EUCOM staff may also be appointed as the chief of staff or deputy commander.⁵⁰ However, by the time a JTF commander is chosen the EUCOM working group may have already come up with courses of action and/or deployed forces to the region. Even components may be kept out of the loop because of "close-hold" requirements levied by the Joint Staff.⁵¹

The main drawback is that the component may be unfamiliar with joint doctrine. Service components can train as a JTF headquarters via U.S. Atlantic Command's training program, *Unified Endeavor*. This requires juggling both service and joint training. Also, the level of expertise training only once every two years is less than training annually.⁵²

The JTF commander may remain in charge of his component and risk losing focus. The commander may become so involved in tactical concerns of his component that he loses touch with operational and strategic issues. GEN William Westmoreland in Vietnam, although effectively a sub-unified commander, became totally focused on the tactical level.

There is also the problem of picking the right component headquarters. But without *a priori* determining the way of the operation, which is what the JTF is going to plan, how can the right headquarters be selected? Typically CINCs use *preponderance of forces*; if the operation requires a preponderance of ground forces, a ground component is selected. This puts the cart before the horse; at best it is a good guess and at worse a major defeat. How can the exact *means* be known before the way is determined?

THE FUNCTION OF COMMAND AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY FORMATIONS

For the lone general who with subtlety must control a host of a million against an enemy as fierce as tigers, advantages and disadvantages are intermixed. In the face of countless changes he must be wise and flexible; he must bear in mind all possibilities. Unless he is stout of heart and his judgment not confused, how would he be able to respond to circumstances without coming to his wits' end? And how settle affairs without grave difficulties, how could he not be alarmed? How could he control the myriad matters without being confused?⁵³

The Art War

This chapter will describe command; its function and importance. This chapter will also investigate how permanent military formations developed. Command and

military formations are directly related and influence one another. History demonstrates that permanent command and military formations are the best means to conduct operations.⁵⁴

The command function and development of military formations are related to two principles of war; the objective and unity of command. The first principle calls for clear, decisive, and attainable objectives for military operations. There can be strategic, operational, and tactical objectives, but all must be linked to the ultimate endstate and consistent with national policy. Unity of command calls for one commander to direct operation towards the common objective. U.S. involvement in non-combat operations, coalitions, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) complicate determining an objective and obtaining unity of command. Political considerations predominate in these operations and require a unique viewpoint; tactical level considerations are not sufficient.⁵⁵

Command directs available means towards accomplishing a specific mission. Success requires visualizing the current and future state of friendly and enemy forces, and then designing a scheme that achieves the end state. Command must preserve the forces' fighting capability and defeat an enemy quickly; two aspects typically at odds. Command is the most important element in accomplishing any objective and must be exercised continuously.⁵⁶

Martin van Creveld says there is also an intangible aspect to command:

The informal, and sometimes tacit, communication that goes on inside an organization: its vital, but ultimately undefinable, ability to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information fed to it: the mental processes that, often unknown even to himself, do take place inside a commander's head; that tone of voice with which a report is delivered, or an order issued; the look on a man's face, the glimmer in his eye, when handed this or that message---none of these would be recorded.⁵⁷

Because this aspect is immeasurable, it can be overlooked when assessing the organizations capability to fight; or worse, taken for granted. History suggests this informal communication is only developed over time and in relatively permanent organizations. This type of relationship allows an organization to produce plans quicker than the enemy.⁵⁸

Furthermore, the ultimate purpose of command is to “make certain of each and every one of a vast multitude of details, then, each of which must be coordinated with all others in order to achieve optimum results.”⁵⁹ The history of command is best understood as a race between “the demand for information and the ability of command systems to meet it.”⁶⁰ In other words, an attempt to maximize certainty. The level of certainty depends on the quantity and quality of information one has, and the task one must accomplish; insufficient, untimely, or false information reduces performance. However, more information increases processing time and the risk of not distinguishing relevant from irrelevant, important from unimportant, reliable from unreliable, true from false. Only by “a superior understanding” based on “training and practice, but ultimately relying no less on intuitive judgment than on rational calculation” can one break out of the dilemma. Again, this suggests that a permanent command echelon will be more capable at handling this aspect of command.⁶¹

The concept of control is inherent in command and provides command the means to measure, report, and correct performance. The means to control command functions can be organizational, procedural, and technical. The commanders chief means of organizational control is the military staff. The commander and staff are a team responsible for orchestrating the available forces towards a specific endstate. They

orchestrate by creating a operational plan that gives subordinate echelons tasks; accomplishing the tasks achieves the desired endstate.⁶²

Modern military staffs are use a “function-based” model. This model has a commander and supported by a staff of functional experts. Modern staffs subdivide into divisions as shown in figure 1. The chief of staff directs the overall conduct of the commander’s staff. He has no command authority of components, unless he is also the deputy commander and acting in the commander’s absence.⁶³




Figure 1. Traditional/Napoleonic Staff Model⁶⁴

The personnel division manages manpower, formulates personnel policies, and supervises administration of command personnel and enemy prisoners of war. The intelligence division ensures the availability, and reliability of information on the operational area, and enemy capabilities and intentions as quickly as possible. The operations division assists in the direction and control of operations. This begins with planning and ends when operations are completed. The logistics division formulates logistic plans and coordinates and supervises related logistics functions. The plans division performs long-range or future planning, and prepares campaign plans and associated estimates of the situation; it may also create command policy. The command, control, communications, and computer systems (C4) division is responsible

for communications, electronics, and automated information systems. This includes development and integration of C4 architectures and plans supporting operational and strategic requirements, as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable C4 systems.⁶⁵

This model is essentially the one that has been in use since Napoleonic times. Its chief advantage is the ability to analyze a problem and provide an adequate, suitable, and feasible solution. Its main drawback is that it is a large organization, expensive to maintain. Any reductions in size are spread across the organization, risking its ability to accomplish its function.⁶⁶

The complexity of modern war and orchestration of service capabilities require a trained and practiced joint staff. The joint staff officer needs a broad knowledge and view to be effective. The military theorist Baron de Jomini believed a “well-instructed general staff is one of the most useful of organizations.” The development of military staffs paralleled the development of modern military formations.⁶⁷

The development of modern permanent military formations began in the 17th century. The prototypes for modern battalions, regiments, and brigades were introduced by Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, during the Thirty Years’ War. His changes improved the flexibility and responsiveness of linear formations and solved the problem of combined infantry, cavalry, and artillery actions.⁶⁸

The next major development was the development of divisions and corps during the early 19th century. In 1794 the French division included infantry, artillery, and cavalry units and could carry-out independent operations. When the size of combined divisions reached 200,000 troops, the French created the *corps d’armée* to control them. The corps could be given an independent mission over a larger expanse of

territory. Napoleon's Grand Army eventually comprised multiple corps' allowing operations to encompass Europe. During his invasion of Russia, Napoleon acted as an army group commander controlling multiple *field armies*; these were *ad hoc* and may have contributed to his defeat.⁶⁹

During the American Civil War both sides created permanent field armies to control multiple corps. Where the corps could fight and win a battle, the field army could fight a "mini-campaign" or series of battles. A good example of the superiority of permanent versus *ad hoc* echelons comes from the Civil War.⁷⁰

In 1863 Union forces under MG U.S. Grant finally penetrated the Mississippi River south of Vicksburg. After brief engagements at Port Gibson, Raymond, and Jackson, two Union corps approached the Mississippi town of Edwards' Station. Just east of there Union forces encountered an *ad hoc* Confederate field army under LTG John Pemberton, the Confederate district commander. Union forces were grouped under permanent echelons that had some training. The Confederate *ad hoc* command structure was too brittle to defend successfully and withdrew. The important point is that a permanent formation brings with it a commander and staff that can orchestrate the parts or sub-divisions.⁷¹

Both service and joint commanders create military plans to achieve some endstate. Only the JFC plans campaigns; these are inherently joint and designed to achieve a strategic or operational objective. They are joint by nature, and involve combat and non-combat operations. The joint echelon is essential to achieving strategic ends; winning every tactical battle does not guarantee achieving strategic ends, as U.S. experience in Vietnam demonstrates.⁷²

Joint echelons were first created during World War II by the U.S. in both Pacific and European theaters. In reality service “politics” did not allow for complete orchestration of available forces. For instance, the strategic bombing operations over Germany and Japan were controlled by GEN Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force, through subordinates in each theater. Friction developed when GEN Eisenhower requested use of “strategic” bombers during preparation for the Normandy invasion. GEN Eisenhower needed to get approval from the JCS to use them. Unified commands during World War II were appropriately more operational than strategic. The development of a theater strategic perspective occurred after the war.⁷³

After the war unified commands were set-up as the “unification” of the armed forces developed. Unified commands such as Far East Command (FECOM) were assigned warfighting responsibilities for specific geographical areas. Again these post-war unified commands had an operational perspective that developed into a theater strategic one over time. As a result a gap opened between service components and the CINC. The JTF was developed to fill this gap, but as an *ad hoc* formation it violates lessons learned from history.⁷⁴

Command is directly related to a military formation’s size, complexity, and differentiation. Assigning missions or tasks becomes more difficult as forces subdivide into discrete units; the reverse is equally true, and more appropriate for joint forces; they are brought together as components. This difficulty is proportional to the number of units, weapons lethality, speed, and range, and operational area.

The development of military formations shows that permanent formations are more effective than *ad hoc* ones in dealing with this difficulty. If this is accepted wisdom for service echelons, it should be accepted for joint echelons as well. The services rely

on existing echelons to efficiently and effectively perform command functions; history shows this works. Joint warfare seems to be happy with second-best. If *ad hoc* is an acceptable way of organizing then the services can save a lot of money and disband its highest formations, establishing them only when a crisis occurs.⁷⁵

Ironically joint doctrine agrees that permanent echelons are more effective than *ad hoc* echelons. As Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Other Than War* states:

Planners should attempt to maintain unit integrity. US forces train as units, and are best able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact. By deploying as an existing unit, forces are able to continue to operate under established procedures, adapting these to the mission and situation, as required. When personnel and elements are drawn from various commands, effectiveness is decreased. By deploying without established operating procedures, an *ad hoc* force is less effective and takes more time to adjust to requirements of the mission.⁷⁶

Obviously this passage is referring to service component forces, but it is still relevant to fighting joint forces effectively.

The capabilities of modern military forces provide a the JFC with a high level of lethality, range, flexibility, and differentiation. Modern joint forces have huge differences in capabilities and doctrine. Commanders and staffs can not learn to exploit these differences over night. Experience suggests there is no “crawl-walk-run progression for a JTF--- it’s a flat-out sprint from day one.”⁷⁷

ANALYSIS OF JOINT TASK FORCES

We have identified danger, physical exertion, intelligence, and friction as the elements that coalesce to form the atmosphere of war, and turn it into a medium that impedes activity. Is there any lubricant that will reduce this abrasion? Only one, and a commander and his army will not always have it readily available: combat experience.⁷⁸

Clausewitz

This chapter will analyze JTF operations between 1983 and 1993. It will start with Operation Urgent Fury as an example of a JTF operation before the Goldwater-

Nichols Act of 1986. It will then describe changes that occurred under Goldwater-Nichols related to JTF effectiveness. The chapter will then examine lessons learned from other JTF operations to determine if the problems encountered are associated with the JTF's *ad hoc* nature. The impact of Goldwater-Nichols will be assessed as well.

Between 1983 and 1993 the U.S. conducted twenty-three JTF operations. These operations included combat and non-combat activities; sixty-five percent involved humanitarian or disaster relief missions. Most JTFs completed their missions or transferred them to another organization within 60 days. The paper will now analyze Operation Urgent Fury that took place on the southern Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983.⁷⁹

In 1979 Grenada became a client state to the Soviet Union and Cuba after the native socialist party seized power. The construction of a large airfield concerned the U.S. administration, because of Grenada's proximity to a sea route used for importing oil into the U.S. There were also several hundred Americans on the island attending a medical school. The Reagan Administration ordered a military operation to rescue the American students and preserve regional stability, after political rivals killed Grenada's leader.⁸⁰

On 14 October 1983, the JCS tasked U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) to begin planning an evacuation of American citizens. LANTCOM developed several courses of action covering both permissive and hostile environments. On 21 October the JCS added neutralizing the Grenadine armed forces and stabilizing the country as objectives. The JCS conceived the operation as a *coupe de main*--a surprise attack to overwhelm an enemy giving him little or no time to react effectively.⁸¹

On 22 October 1983 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) sent an execute order to

LANTCOM:

Conduct military operations to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadine forces, stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace. In conjunction with OECS/friendly government participants, assist in restoration of a democratic government on Grenada.⁸²

LANTCOM had a carrier battle group, an amphibious readiness group, and two Ranger battalions to use for combat operations. Units from the 82d Airborne Division were available for a follow-on peacekeeping role.⁸³

On 23 October, LANTCOM designated the commander of the U.S. Navy's 2nd Fleet as commander JTF 120. Seventeen officers from the 2nd Fleet staff formed the nucleus of the JTF 120 staff. A handful of Army and Air Force liaison officers augmented the JTF staff bringing the total to 25 officers. Also assigned were State Department and CIA representatives. The commander of the 24th Infantry Division was initially assigned as an "advisor" to the JTF commander, who appointed him deputy commander on the second day of the invasion. These officers were essentially strangers and had not worked together before. They also lacked experience in coordinating joint fire support.⁸⁴

The forces assigned to JTF 120 included forces from all the services and totaled 22,000 personnel, but only 5000 U.S. troops landed on the island. The U.S. estimated enemy forces at 1200-1400 Grenadine regulars and 3000-5000 militia. However, enemy forces included 475 Grenadine regulars with some mechanized capability and 250 militia troops. There were also 600 Cuban construction workers, and 43 Cuban military specialists on the island.⁸⁵

- The operation began on 23 October 1983 and ended on 14 December when JTF 120 disestablished. Peacekeeping operations continued for 18 more months. The

operation accomplished its mission quickly with low casualties. However, a number of problems plagued the operation.⁸⁶

U.S. forces lacked basic information about Grenada and the current situation on the island; impacting planning and execution of initial tasks. The operation had lost tactical surprise undercutting the basis for a *coupe de main*. U.S. were unaware of the Cuban's capabilities or intentions, that the Grenadines were preparing for the landings, the location of the main Grenadine military sector headquarters, or the whereabouts of all American students was also unknown. This is a serious planning error since rescuing students was a major objective and justified the operation.⁸⁷

Current information was available and there was time to incorporate it into planning. The Barbadian intelligence service had detailed knowledge of the situation on Grenada and the status of its armed forces. However, LANTCOM or JTF 120 had no liaison officers from Barbados attached. The information was available from former students and the families of current students. It is conceivable that capture of the main Grenadine headquarters would have prevented resistance or it would have ended sooner.⁸⁸

Many of these problems highlight the inability of LANTCOM to conduct the "full spectrum" of operations expected of a unified command. It was essentially an optimized for Naval operations in the Atlantic and had minimal expertise in "joint" operations. The *ad hoc* nature of JTF 120 and its lack of experience only compounded the problem.

Communications problems also plagued the operation. The JTF commander could not talk to his immediate ground combat commanders. Marine and Army units, in adjacent areas, could not talk to each other. Although the principal cause was incompatible equipment, the operation's planning contributed to the problem.⁸⁹

Martin van Creveld says a permanent unit's cohesion reduces the need for communications. Furthermore, giving subordinates the resources they need to do assigned tasks also reduces communications requirements. Alternatively, a good plan assigns tasks that are within a unit's *existing* capabilities. Edward Luttwak states that "only simple works" in war; simple plans executed by units using initiative minimizes communication requirements. These two distinguished scholars derive their conclusions from battles conducted by permanent military echelons.⁹⁰

In Urgent Fury units required coordination because they could not perform their tasks by themselves. For example, during the mission to liberate Grenada's Governor General, the SEAL team rescuers had to be rescued themselves after being attacked by Grenadine mechanized forces. Proper planning can partially make-up for a lack of intelligence by ensuring the forces fit the task or are given the necessary support.⁹¹

Developing simple plans requires training and practice. Assigning tasks to subordinates requires knowledge of their capabilities. A trained and practiced headquarters has this knowledge. Neither LANTCOM nor JTF 120 had the training and experience in integrating joint operations, and this affected the operation. An experienced LANTCOM staff would have developed a better plan in the twelve days before the operation started. A trained JTF staff would have found and fixed the plan's flaws, even within the 48 hours before operations began. In fact, one of the recommendations from Urgent Fury was to review the idea of a deployable standing joint task force. A headquarters trained to orchestrate joint forces, in combat and non-combat operations, will avoid the pitfalls met in Urgent Fury.⁹²

In the aftermath of Urgent Fury, the 241 Marines killed in Lebanon, and the failed hostage rescue in Iran, the U.S. Congress became energized to "fix" the apparent

problems in joint operations. The resulting legislation was the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 mentioned in a previous section. But what did Goldwater-Nichols do for JTFs?⁹³

The most significant change impacting JTF operations was clarifying the CINC's authority by giving him combatant command of forces assigned to his theater. It gave the CINC authority to organize and employ forces to meet his mission. Goldwater-Nichols clearly designates the chain as running through the President and SECDEF to the CINC.⁹⁴

Goldwater-Nichols also required unified command staffs to have officers from each service commensurate with the forces assigned to the command. The intent was to ensure commands such as LANTCOM could conduct the full range of operations expected. In 1991, LANTCOM became ACOM and assumed command of all CONUS based forces. It was also assigned the task of joint force integrator.⁹⁵

Goldwater-Nichols also created a new category of officer; the joint specialty officer (JSO). The JSO is trained in "the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces."⁹⁶ This encompasses "matters relating to: national military strategy, strategic planning and contingency planning, and *command and control of combat operations under unified command*."⁹⁷ In other words, the JSO will have the expertise to serve on a joint staff. By law, an officer becomes a JSO only after completing a joint duty assignment and joint education.⁹⁸

However, the history of JTF operations and exercises since Goldwater-Nichols suggests the full potential of JSOs has not been exploited. Their joint expertise is diluted by being used only as augmentees to component-based JTFs, rather than being the nucleus of a permanent joint echelon. The paper will now examine some lessons from joint operations and exercises between 1987 and 1994.

There are some general lessons learned from the twenty-one JTF operations between 1983 and 1993. All twenty-one required coordinating with organizations outside the JTF's chain of command. The JTF had to negotiate with these organizations on different courses of action. Effective coordination required dealing with security issues, lack of established relationships, and lack authority at the working level. Security issues prevented sharing classification with outside agencies and organizations. Lack of pre-established relationships required participants to learn each other's capabilities and limitations.⁹⁹

Creating JTFs just before the start of operations exacerbates these problems. A permanent organization charged with conducting combat and non-combat operations in a given theater can work out arrangements before operations. U.S. forces routinely conduct training with multinational militaries to establish such a relationship. This exposes both sides to their mutual doctrines as well as capabilities and limitations. During the planning phase it is essential to contact as many potential players as possible, because even the best trained headquarters will not have all the information in-house. Establishing these relationships minimizes the friction so prevalent in joint, multinational, and multi-agency/organization operations.

JTFs had difficulty determining the end-state and the measurement of progress in humanitarian operations; primarily due to the lack of doctrine. Doctrine is based on experience in both operations and training, and the experience base of service components, the typical nucleus of JTFs, was and is *combat* operations. Planning both combat and non-combat operations requires a trained and practiced joint headquarters. This will allow tactical forces to focus on one; the joint headquarters acts as a bridge between the two.¹⁰⁰

Operations in Panama in 1989 illustrate what happens when transition from combat and non-combat operations is uncoordinated. Two separate but related operations were created to achieve U.S. political objectives in Panama. The first operation, Just Cause, would remove Manuel Noriega and the Panamanian Defense Force, and protect the Panama Canal. By all accounts Just Cause was a success, achieving its political objectives quickly with relatively low cost. The XVIII Airborne Corps planners demonstrated what a well trained and *permanent* planning staff can accomplish.¹⁰¹

The last political objective was to restore democracy to Panama under Operation Promote Liberty. Just Cause operations had destroyed much of Panama's civil infrastructure. The destruction of the PDF had eliminated police, immigration, air traffic control, and postal service; all under PDF control. Noriega's dictatorship had stifled development of political parties and effective civil institutions. The result was a week of riots and looting, taking several weeks to completely pacify the country.¹⁰²

The problem with the transition to non-combat operations was due to poor planning. Promote Liberty was planned by U.S. Southern Command's planning division. The division lacked the expertise and organizational stability to plan this operation. The main causes were compartmentalization and close hold status placed on the information and the use of reserve civil affairs specialists. As a result few planners were cleared for the program, limiting expertise and corporate knowledge. Those that were cleared into the program were read out when they completed their active status. They could no longer discuss the information even with other previously cleared reservists.¹⁰³

Unity of command in Panama was achieved only at the CINC level instead of the JTF where it should have been. This risked losing focus on other issues in Latin

America. SOUTHCOM lacked an subordinate echelon that could plan and execute both combat and non-combat operations.¹⁰⁴

Another aspect JTF operations between '83 and '93 is that half required a compressed timeline. The JTF commander and staff had less than 72 hours notice to plan in ten operations. A well-trained staff can handle compressed timelines by using an abbreviated planning process. Being well trained requires practice and organizational stability. JTFs by nature lack organizational stability.¹⁰⁵

The need for some stability at the JTF level has been a consistent theme in a number of JTF operations and exercises. A *scratch* JTF staff during Operation Provide Comfort resulted in confusion over operating procedures. The initial lack of personnel prevented 24 hour operations, and upchannel reporting suffered. A report from relief operations for Hurricane Andrew in 1992 said that a permanent JTF would have improved planning. Although staff officers were enthusiastic, this "group of strangers" became effective only after becoming familiar with each other. The initial strangeness inhibited subordinate commands from responding effectively. The same report said that "an *ad hoc* JTF cannot overcome the lack of training, organizational dynamics, and standing operating procedures necessary to command and control a large operation." It recommended creating a "permanent, rapidly deployable, fully capable JTF headquarters available to support any CINC in time of disaster."¹⁰⁶

This recommendation occurred again in other JTF operations and exercises. A report from the Somalia relief mission in 1992 noted impediments in making a service headquarters the "optimum" JTF headquarters. These included: a lack of expertise in joint doctrine, a service versus joint mindset, exercises lacking fidelity to real world, and insufficient staff depth to perform all functions. An observation was made that a

“standing JTF headquarters” would obtain a more proficient staff and reduce the effort that goes into creating *ad hoc* JTFs.¹⁰⁷

During exercise Ocean Venture 92 difficulties in changing from one JTF to another led to a number of staff actions being lost. The participants recommended that the staff should do a phased transition instead of changing with the commander. The problem with this is the component commander loses his staff until it has completed transition. The component ends-up with an *ad hoc* staff. A permanent joint echelon will not have this problem; it stays in place until all strategic objectives have been achieved.¹⁰⁸

Another problem that can occur with an *ad hoc* organization is not being tied in to the CINC’s strategy. This prevented one JTF commander from doing a thorough review of all potential courses of action. The report recommended standing-up the JTF at the earliest opportunity. Of course if the JTF already existed and assigned to a CINC it would know the CINC’s strategy.¹⁰⁹

During a 1994 Bright Star exercise U.S. Central Command’s army component, ARCENT, was unprepared to become a JTF headquarters. It lacked both training and personnel with “joint” expertise. The recommendation called for a cadre of joint experts to “augment” the component staff, especially for the operations and planning divisions. This is essentially a half measure to the problem. The service component believes that “augmentation” with a handful of personnel from other services will make them proficient in “integrating the operations of air, land, and sea.”¹¹⁰

Analysis of JTF operations since 1983 suggests they were conducted by a single component under the guise of being joint. Only a small cadre of officers from other services augmented the component headquarters. This is similar to how tactical

commands use liaison officers, such as an air liaison officer at corps and division headquarters. The typical JTF will have two groups of people that must learn to work together, typically in a short timeline. From the author's experience what usually happens is the insiders, from the service component, will work the problem and only bring in the outsiders, the augmentees, on specific "tactical" aspects. Even JSOs are used in an augmentee capacity. An effective joint staff requires experts in joint operations.¹¹¹

It is also worth noting that the success of these JTF operations was as much a factor of a weak enemy and relatively benign environment as it is of military prowess. In Grenada, Panama, northern Iraq, and other combat operations the U.S. did not fight a peer or even near peer competitor. A more capable enemy in a more hostile environment may be more of a challenge to the *ad hoc* organization we have come to rely on.¹¹²

Although Goldwater-Nichols made significant improvements to joint officer training and education, this alone can not fix the problems inherent to *ad hoc* military formations. If we assume JSOs are being created as intended by Congress, their expertise is not being fully exploited by the national military establishment. To meet the intent of Congress and be consistent with history, the JSO should form the nucleus of a joint headquarters with augmentation by the service components. However, forming JTFs with JSOs will not meet the test of serious combat unless a permanent organization exists to nurture the expertise required to plan and conduct joint warfare. This is consistent with how modern military formations developed.

Lessons learned from these JTF operations and exercises demonstrate the need for a permanent, deployable joint echelon that can deal with both combat and non-combat operations.

THE JOINT FORCES GROUP CONCEPT

Although most history books glorify our military accomplishments, a closer examination reveals a disconcerting pattern: unpreparedness at the start of a war; initial failures; reorganizing while fighting; cranking up our industrial base; and ultimately prevailing by wearing down the enemy—by being bigger, not smarter.

General David C. Jones,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
1978-1982.¹¹³

This chapter is about developing a smarter way of fighting by creating a smarter echelon to fight with. Integral to this is developing smarter people to fight in that new echelon. The JFG will be a permanent and deployable headquarters at the operational level of war capable of planning and executing combat and non-combat campaigns.

The JFG structure will not use the traditional staff model. This 189 year old model cannot deal with modern missions effectively or efficiently. Three contemporary characteristics make this model obsolete: real-time information capability, speed of the decision-making cycle, and the need to save money. The first acknowledges that current information technology provides commanders with ability to see events as they happen and to give direction to forces on the scene. High command access to modern information systems make 80 percent of the Napoleonic staff's input irrelevant. The second reality drives staffs to complete the decision cycle as quick as possible; faster than CNN. The current model is not deft enough to move quickly. In fact, its aim is slow methodical action to ensure a level of certainty. Finally, the lack of a peer threat drives the quest for cost savings; large staffs are expensive to maintain.¹¹⁴

A more appropriate model is one based on time rather than function. The time-based model promises to increase the ability to focus on crises, an earlier participation of key leaders and staff officers, and to reduce manning levels without sacrificing long-range planning. It also eliminates having to restructure a staff during crises and the need to spread cuts across the staff.¹¹⁵

Figure 2 represents this concept. The senior decision cell contains the commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, operations officer, and logistics officer; strategies, options, and tasks are discussed here. The battle staff ring contains the primary staff officers that are responsible for suspense's of 24 hours or less; it should be comprised of "experienced, independent thinkers."¹¹⁶ The support ring is a second group of officers that backup the battle staff; it performs "quick, detailed research" for tasks with suspense's of one month or less; this ring also acts as a training stage for the second ring.¹¹⁷ The last ring contains the command's long-range planners; its is isolated from the "lighting-speed" requirements of the first three rings.¹¹⁸




Figure 2. Time-Based Staff Concept

One of the reasons for not creating standing joint forces is the manpower requirements. There are two aspects to this. First, there are not enough tactical forces

for every unified command to create a full-time joint *force*. The solution is to maintain the concept of the TPFDD whereby forces are “assigned” for planning purposes. Second, the manpower required for a senior level planning staff is very large and becomes prohibitively expensive to maintain. The model’s authors estimate it will save 25 percent in manpower overhead. Figure 3 shows how the JFG looks using this model.¹¹⁹




Figure 2. Joint Force Group

As is apparent this model is highly streamlined. What used to be four divisions are now two. Combining operations and intelligence makes sense when one realizes that the two are inseparable. The discussion of command in the second chapter makes this point. The combination will speed the decision cycle for “current” or on-going operations; what is happening today. The plans division remains separate because it is looking out 96 hours or more. The personnel and logistics divisions are naturally similar because they both relate to providing resources. This structure should require approximately 450 people.¹²⁰

This structure relies to a great extent on what already exists at the CINC level and the component level. The headquarters does not need to take over higher or lower capabilities that are best done at those levels. The JFG focuses on campaign planning

and execution for one or two CINCs. Attempting to do what the CINC or a component does is unnecessary. During peacetime the unified command will prepare the theater for operations as much as possible. Development of joint procedures, and common logistics and communications systems minimizes the need for direction on these matters.

The JFG can take advantage of common communications standards already under development and the advances in information systems. A concept called “knowledge-based warfare” promises to reduce staffs without reducing planning capability. These advances also support combining operations and intelligence divisions.¹²¹

Deployments to undeveloped areas will depend on bare-base equipment, mobile command posts, and rapid transportation. For example, the Air Force has a deployable base system called Harvest Eagle. The Air Force also has an airborne command and control platform and the Navy has a sea-based version. Emphasis must be placed on rapidity and deployability.

There are two distinctions between a joint command and a component or tactical command echelon that support this streamlining. First, all forces in a joint command come through service components. In contrast, an army corps contains separate artillery, aviation, and support brigades. During combat operations these forces are used to strengthen the corps commander’s main effort and perform independent corps operations.¹²²

Second, the joint command is responsible for orchestrating joint arms. The product of the joint commander and staff team is a campaign plan. This plan gives tasks to component commanders to achieve strategic endstates. In other words it is the

aggregate capability of components that the joint level must orchestrate. This requires knowledge of, and emphasis on, aggregate capability. The JFG will not fight the components fight; it gives them the right task, commensurate with their capabilities.

To clarify this point further, one can compare a corps and its divisions to a joint force and its components. The corps commander gives his divisions tasks in line with his intent and vision. He typically assigns one division the main effort and other divisions as supporting efforts; the supporting effort's *task*, supports the main effort's task. Typically, the supporting effort division does not attack targets in another division's area of operations. Furthermore, the supporting division does not give up its organic assets unless a corps-wide reorganization or reconstitution is necessary. Unity of command occurs at the corps commander level; the main effort division commander does not control his supporting divisions tasks or resources.

Likewise with joint forces unity of command occurs at the JFG's level. The JFG's components, like the divisions in a corps, support one another through the their *tasks*; the combination of which achieves the campaign's aim. The *supporting* versus *supported* construct becomes moot; all components support the JFC, period. Mutual support occurs by orchestrating the component's capabilities properly. In this sense the objective itself becomes the *main effort* rather than a particular component; each component involved has a piece of the action. Determining who is dominant, is irrelevant; both must accomplish their tasks to create a decision.¹²³

As figure 2 shows the JFG will be commanded by a mid-grade Lieutenant General. This officer will have extensive joint experience; he will be a qualified JSO. Ideally he will have experience working in multiple positions on a JFG staff; all three if possible to provide broad knowledge on its operations, eventually moving to the Chief of

Staff position. An assignment to a CINC staff or Joint Staff would follow. Selection of a Lt. General as commander is supported by the history of JTF operations. Only one of twenty-three JTF operations between 1983 and 1993 had a full general in command. The current and likely future environment also support that any deployment of more than a modern army corps, commanded by a Lt. General, is unlikely.¹²⁴

For those occasions requiring a full general two options are available. The first is to brevet the JFG commander to full general. Brevet ranks are typically not used during peacetime and legislation may have to be introduced to make this happen. The second option is to let the unified command's deputy commander (DCINC) take command. In this instance the JFG commander will become the deputy commander. In either situation commanders will not be well served if their staff officers are deficient; it is this pool of joint specialists that help the JFG make his vision for victory a reality.

The competence and ability of a military staff rests on training, education, and experience. The first two have a tendency to be confused as the same thing; they are not. However, all three things are related and overlap; one learns from experience, and one gets experience from training and education. Training teaches a specific skill; what to do in a given situation(s). Training requires an existing base experience from which a standard of performance can be developed; the rifle has to be invented before its use can be trained.¹²⁵

On the other hand, education has a broader concern; developing the mind. Education teaches how to think rather than what to do; this is more applicable at operational level; where ambiguity and uncertainty prevails. An educated mind is better prepared to deal with new environments and situations, where a template does not exist.¹²⁶

Current joint education will have to improve. The joint community has a staff officer training course at the Armed Forces Staff College, but it is only 90 days long. Furthermore only those assigned to a joint or combined command and who complete intermediate service schools get to attend. EUCOM expects that most officers on JTF staffs will not have joint training. Services spend much time and resources training their staff officers; intermediate professional military education typically lasts 10 months and is backed by ten to twelve years of experience.¹²⁷

The most significant difference between service and joint staff officers is that former go to permanent echelons that will actually conduct operations. Joint officers typically go to unified or combined commands and may be detailed as augmentees to a JTF. While their service counterparts practice planning skills on a regular basis, the joint officer has a limited opportunity to practice. Assuming joint staff officers truly understand how to orchestrate joint forces, it is they who should form any joint staff; the JFG will give them that opportunity.¹²⁸

Campaign planning is the skill required at operational level. Simply put, campaign planning is determining the way to achieve strategic objectives with the tactical means available. The JFG will use the existing campaign planning method, but offers an excellent means of improving it through practice.

The more significant aspect of planning is identifying enemy weakness. As the Chinese military theorist, Sun Tzu, wrote, "Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."¹²⁹ At the operational level the enemy is not just his armed forces; it includes the decision making apparatus that animates those armed forces. Defeat of the enemies armed forces may appear to be the obvious path to victory, but this is essentially a tactical view.¹³⁰

Knowing the enemy means studying him as a complete entity; culturally, politically, sociologically, to name a few. The less tangible elements of human society are at least as important as the tangible elements, and maybe more so. The U.S. military has often focused only on the tangible aspects as the path to victory; defeating his fielded military forces or destroying his industrial capacity to wage war. The JFC determines *how* to get the enemy to conform to our political objectives in the shortest time and lowest casualties. His primary concern is winning the peace and not just winning the *combats*.¹³¹

Joint arms and their employment requires a new way of thinking that takes us beyond the tactical paradigm. This new way of thinking must be built around what one writer calls *strategic thinkers*. These officers are “critical, creative, broad-gauged visionaries with the intellect to dissect the status quo, grasp the big picture, discern important relationships among events, generate imaginative possibilities for action, and operate easily in the conceptual realm.”¹³² Strategic thinking focuses on national interests and objectives, the enemy’s vulnerabilities, what it takes to achieve victory, and how quickly this can be achieved. In contrast, tactical thinking focuses on the military objective, the enemy’s military capabilities, defeating the enemy’s military, and the way to defeat that military. Neither are wrong; both types are essential.¹³³

The JFC commander and staff will spend more time studying the areas they may have to fight. This will include learning the language(s) as well as attending symposiums and courses on the countries in their area of responsibility. Officers will visit different countries within the assigned AORs to understand the society. To know an enemy is to understand how he thinks which requires getting inside his mind. This level of understanding reveals an enemy’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Application of

military force then becomes more efficient, if not more effective. An analogy with human pressure points is apt. In hand-to-hand combat one can beat an opponent until he is a senseless, bloody heap; this is the brute force way, the attrition approach. However, exploiting the opponents pressure points defeats him much cleaner and quicker.¹³⁴

The JFG will have to rely primarily on command post exercises to achieve proficiency; it is too expensive to bring together actual forces to train on a regular basis. Current training programs like ACOM's Unified Endeavor will provide initial training to new JFGs. But once these groups are established they will provide their own training in the same way service units do. ACOM will then act as check on unit proficient at the request of CINCs. The current joint land, aerospace, and sea simulation (JLASS) will be an important method of JFG training. JLASS structures the exercise to learn about service capabilities and promote risk-taking. The emphasis at the JFG will be on learning not winning.¹³⁵

Improvements to JLASS and other computer-based simulations must emphasize the uncertainty at the operational and strategic levels. Most military simulations are based on linear mathematical equations designed to highlight a particular aspect of conflict, such as casualties or weapons lethality. Unfortunately, war is chaotic and is better represented by non-linear mathematics. Computer-based simulations should be developed to take advantage of this concept. These simulations promise not only to train planners, but to educate them as well. It will give them an opportunity to explore different combinations of forces in different situations. Over time a pattern may emerge that can be applied in real conflict. While simulations can not replace actual experience, but they provide good benefit if used as tools for learning. They will not predict or determine victory in future conflicts.¹³⁶

In fact, study of non-linear systems suggests campaign planning should target enemy *processes* rather than its force structure. These processes include feedback loops, the mind of the enemy leader/commander, Clausewitzian friction, and the enemy's decision-making system. Each of them have non-linear aspects that allow one to achieve disproportionate outcomes with minimal input. This has direct application to a smaller U.S. military that still has global responsibilities; that must fight smarter rather than bigger.¹³⁷

JFG training will also include maintaining an understanding of service capabilities. JFG staff officers will visit and witness component level exercises and wargames; whether or not the JFG is playing. Understanding aggregate component capabilities and limitations is essential for proper planning. Technology drives changes in tactics, therefore the JFG staff must maintain currency on those changes.

Because modern military operations encompass combat and non-combat operations, the JFG must be adept at both. This is not as hard as it sounds. Both types of operations share a basic structure; there is a problem, there is a desirable end state to the problem, and there are means to solve the problem. In each case the missing piece is determining how to solve the problem. In reality things are never this simple. The end state maybe *fuzzy* and the means may be promised to more than one JFG or operation. The JFG commander and staff must then fall back on their individual and collective intellects to blaze a new trail. In the final analysis the mind is the key to victory.

CONCLUSION

War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.

Sun Tzu

This paper set out to investigate creating a deployable joint warfighting headquarters at the operational level of war called the *Joint Forces Group*. The paper

reviewed current U.S. joint doctrine to show how doctrine divides war into three levels; strategic, operational, and tactical. All three are essential to successfully prosecuting military operations. What is unique about the operational level of war is the requirement to orchestrate joint forces, linking the war's political objectives with discrete military tasks. Of course a CINC can do this, but in reality he then operates at the operational level.¹³⁸

History suggests that ad hoc structures are not the best way to employ military forces. Command is accomplished by a commander and his staff; they are a team that charts the way the mission is accomplished by determining what subordinate echelons will do. Developing an effective team requires organizational stability best achieved in permanent organizations.

The development of modern military formations also suggests that permanent organizations are better than improvised ones. Specialization of arms led to the development of combined arms to provide the greatest flexibility on the battlefield; and now over it as well. The service components are the pinnacle of this specialization and integral to the concept of the JFG. As long as the U.S. needs to exploit and control the land, sea, air and space for its defense, there will be a need for tactical proficient service components. The JFG will rely on components just as the JTF does today.

Looking at the history of JTF operations the paper showed there were problems with creating planning echelons to effectively orchestrate service forces. This did not lead to defeat or mission failure because the tasks were relatively simple and the enemy, in combat operations, was inferior. There is no guarantee that this will remain so. There were occasional recommendations that a permanent echelon would have made some difference.

The JFG will be a deployable, permanent joint headquarters that can more effectively orchestrate joint forces. The JFG is feasible by taking advantage of the joint specialty officer and other changes in joint warfighting. Emphasizing the enemy political leadership as the focus of military operations is consistent with military theory and history.

The United States is the World's only superpower, as such it requires a military organization to project power to protect its vital interests. Arguments over budgets revolve around weapons systems; what kind, how much, who controls and operates them. At the national level a superpower, to remain a superpower, must be able to dominate air, land, sea, and space.

In order to dominate these media the nation's military must be able to orchestrate those forces effectively and efficiently; orchestrating these forces is just as essential as having them. The U.S. has created the military services that provide those forces. It has also created a *joint* community which is charged to orchestrate those forces towards the strategic ends as defined by the political leadership of the U.S. The next step is to create a permanent echelon at the operational level of war: the Joint Forces Group.

END NOTES

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 119.

² Clausewitz, 119.

³ Clausewitz, 120.

⁴ Clausewitz, 120.

⁵ Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), II-12 - II-13, The JTF is a command with forces from more than one military department and has a limited objective and disbands when the objective is achieved.

⁶ The phrase *ad hoc* means to be "concerned with a particular end or purpose" or "formed or used for a specific or immediate problems or needs." It also means "fashioned from whatever is immediately available." All these meanings are applicable to how the U.S. fights at the operational level. *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 10th Edition, s.v. "ad hoc."

⁷ Deterrence is the first goal of any military force as stated in U.S. national security policy. Sun Tzu also said that the acme of military skill was defeat one's opponent without fighting. (see Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77). Clausewitz even describes a success in war "without defeating the enemy's forces" referring to such operations as having "direct political repercussions." (see Clausewitz, 92).

⁸ The intent of coining a new term is for the sake of consistency. Task forces, joint or otherwise, are created for a specific task. When that task is completed the task force is disbanded. In one sense, the Joint Forces Group replaces the concept of an Army Group.

⁹ The military defines *doctrine* as "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application." In essence doctrine is the glue that binds the people and their weapons into an effective fighting unit. The quantity and quality of weapons or people does not guarantee victory in war; flawed doctrine can be a source of defeat. France's doctrine in 1940 undoubtedly contributed to her defeat even though she and her allies had more than enough personnel and equipment to defend successfully. JP 1.02, 174; JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), I-3-4.

¹⁰ Sun Tzu, 111.

¹¹ JP 3-0, II-1.

¹² JP 3-0, II-1. A strategic objective if achieved will affect the war as a whole. An operational objective will affect a campaign. A tactical objective will affect a battle or engagement. JP 3-0, II-2.

¹³ JP 3-0, II-2.

¹⁴ JP 3-0, II-2; Strategy is the "art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives." JP 3-0, II-2. Strategy can also mean "a careful plan or method" which can confuse issues. See *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 10th ed., s.v. "strategy;" Theater strategy is the "art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater." Joint Publication 1-02, *Terms and Definitions* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 539; A paper by Dr. William Gregor describes in some detail the development of the theater strategic level as well as the current US command structure. William J. Gregor, *Toward a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs Understanding the United States Military in the Post Cold War World*, Working Paper #6, (Cambridge: John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, August 1996), passim.

¹⁵ JP 3-0, II-2.

¹⁶ JP 3-0, II-2; Clayton R. Newell, *The Framework of Operational Warfare* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 15.

¹⁷ JP 3-0, II-2-3

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Clausewitz said *Strategy* was "the use of engagements for the object of the war" and *tactics* was "the use of armed forces in the engagement." Clausewitz, 128; Jomini *Strategy* is "the art of properly directing the masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion" and "the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations." Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War*, eds. Thomas E. Griess and Jay Luvass, trans. G. H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1862; reprint Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1971), 11 (page citations are to the reprint edition)..

²² Clausewitz, 177.

²³ Clausewitz, 177. Compare this with the definition of *campaign* from JP 1-02, 82: "A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space."

²⁴ Clausewitz, 177-78; Actually, all military officers should be sensitive to the political nature of war and, especially, operations other than war. Basic officer education should cover strategy, and this should be reinforced throughout an officers tenure. Military education falls into the trap of emphasizing training over broader educational aspects; only imparting skills instead of imparting knowledge; Jay Luvass, "Thinking at the Operational Level, *Parameters* (Spring 1986): 2-6.

²⁵ After reading this article one gets the distinct impression that the United States owes as big a debt to Edmund Burke as it does to George Washington, et. al. Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Burke, Ireland, and America," *National Review* Vol. XLIX, No. 17 (September 15, 1997): 39.

²⁶ Clausewitz, 596.

²⁷ JP 3-0, I-9; William S. Lind, a proponent of maneuver warfare, in critiquing the 1986 edition of the U.S. Army's FM 100-5, said that the goal of operational art should be to hit the enemy's strategic center of gravity" rather than just the enemy's operational center of gravity. The campaign planner should "aim as high as possible"; focus on winning the war or conflict. This points again to a distinction between the joint and component commander; the former will have the means to attack a strategic center of gravity. Most likely this will be through a combination of operations that only he can orchestrate. William S. Lind, "The Operational Art," *Marine Corps Gazette* (April 1988): 45.

²⁸ The doctrine further states that "conflict termination is an essential link between national security strategy, [national military strategy], and posthostility aims." Under the rubric of "JFC" it could be the CINC or a JTF commander. The reason is clear only the JFC can employ all the military means available. A component could not to it because lacks full knowledge and control of other arms. The national strategic level could do it through diplomacy, but over-control of military operations may lead to a undesirable outcome; Vietnam comes to mind. JP 3-0, I-9.

²⁹ JP 3-0, I-9; Unfortunately GEN MacArthur did not understand, or was not willing to understand, that while there maybe no substitute for victory he did not get to determine what that victory looks like. GEN MacArthur wore many hats during the Korean War; the Commander United Nations Command (UNC), CINC of Far East Command (FECOM), Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP). Any one of these jobs would be demanding. He also acted as the JFC-Korea; the Inchon landing is a fairly good example of operational art and maneuver warfare; high risk with a big payoff, although a good chunk of the NKPA escaped north to fight another day. Whether he acceded his span of control is a legitimate question.

³⁰ JP 3-0, II-3.

³¹ Clausewitz, 178-79.

³² Clausewitz, 178-79.

³³ Clausewitz, 178.

³⁴ JP 3-0, II-3.

³⁵ "An engagement is normally short in duration and fought between small forces." "A battle consists of a set of related engagements" and "typically last longer; involve larger; and could affect the course of a campaign." JP 3-0, II-3.

³⁶ Clausewitz, 87.

³⁷ Clausewitz, 577-616 passim; JP 3-0, I-4; The U.S. Constitution divides the control of national military forces between the three branches of the Federal government: legislative, executive, and judicial. The U.S. Congress has the power to "raise and support" the U.S. Armed Forces and regulate military conduct via the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. The President the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces and The U.S. Supreme Court is the top judicial court for military crimes. U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 8, art. II, sec. 2, art. III, sec. 2.

³⁸ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, 99th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 15, 17, 19, 21, 30, 94; Legal measures to strength *jointness* start with the National Security Act of 1947. The intent was to "unify the armed forces...and strengthen defense capability." The act created the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), National Security Council (NSC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the U.S. Air Force as a separate service, and other agencies. The act's proponents hoped it would foster better interservice cooperation and reduce defense costs. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) would serve in the President's cabinet but would not be an executive department; the Army, Navy, and Air Force Secretariats would be executive departments. This made for a very weak Defense Secretary. The JCS included the Chiefs of Staff from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The JCS as a body advised the President on military matters. In 1949 the act was amended that made the SECDEF an executive department, the Department of Defense (DOD), and downgraded the service secretariats to sub-cabinet rank. The change also established the position of Chairman of the JCS (CJCS), established a unitary defense budget, and directed the Commandant of the Marine Corps be consulted when corps issued were to be discussed by the JCS. *Encyclopedia Americana*, 1982 ed., s.v. "National Security Act," Reorganization acts in 1953 and 1958 gave unified commanders responsibility for conducting military operations and increased the size of the Joint Staff from 100 to 400 people; this was also transferred to the Chairman's control. The 1958 act gave the Chairman voting rights on the JCS and directed the service chiefs delegate service affairs to their deputies. The military departments were essentially reduced to training and logistics. These changes although apparently substantial did not have the desired effect of unifying the armed forces. Service chiefs and members of the Joint Staff remained loyal to their services overall. Unified commands became service *fiefdoms*; CINCPAC is Navy, CINCEUR is Army, etc. Services did not send the best officers to serve on joint staffs. In fact, a 1970 commission made conclusions on the level of jointness that resembled those found in a 1948 commission. Lawrence J. Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-five Years* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1976), 14-21; A 1960 commission headed by Senator Stuart Symington, the first Secretary of the Air Force, recommended replacing the service secretaries with two functional secretaries, replacing the JCS with a military advisory council, place CJCS in the command chain, reorganize unified commands into *strategic*, *tactical*, *defense*, and *reserve* commands, and the SECDEF would advise Congress on military requirements before submitting the defense budget. The military advisory council would be made up of senior officers that did not have service responsibilities; the service chiefs would just run the services. Edgar F. Raines and David R. Campbell, *The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Evolution of Army Ideas on the Command, Control, and Coordination of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1942-1985*, Historical Analysis Series (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History), 98-100; The 1970 commission made recommendations that would not be enacted until Goldwater-Nichols. The JCS would be removed from the operational chain of command and replace it with a chief of military operations. The new chief would be in the command chain, linking the unified and specified commanders and the civilian defense secretariat. Also recommended was the creation of three new *joint* commands. *Strategic Command* would take over the nuclear triad forces and target planning responsibilities. *Tactical Command* would be responsible for general purpose forces based in the U.S. that would deploy to unified commands. It would have sub-commands for Europe, the Pacific, and a third comprised of the old *Strike*, *Atlantic*, and *Southern Commands*. The unified commands

themselves would be developed on functional rather than geographic lines. A *Logistics Command* would provide a unified supply for all services. The panel also proposed given unified commanders more input into resource allocation. Raines, 120-123; Neither the 1960 nor 1970 recommendations led to major reorganizations of the defense establishment. Changes that did occur were often the work of strong Defense Secretaries such as Robert McNamara pushing the envelop of existing authority granted by the '53 and '58 acts. Raines, 109; Dissatisfaction with the status quo is a consistent theme in most accounts of defense reorganization, the books on the subject fill many library shelves. Proposed changes went nowhere until the early '80s. Accounts by former Chairmen such as Gen. David Jones and inept execution of military operations such as the attempted rescue of hostages in Iran, energized Congress to hold hearings. The result of these hearings was the Goldwater-Nichols Acts of 1986.

³⁹ JP 1-02, 560.

⁴⁰ JP 3-0, II-11. There are currently five geographical unified commands and four functional commands. The number varies based on the most current Unified Command Plan.

⁴¹ Goldwater-Nichols gave CINCs the authority to ".....direct subordinate commands in all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics; prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command; organize the command and forces within the command; employ forces within the command as he considers necessary to accomplish the command's missions; assign command functions to subordinate commanders; coordinate and approve administrative, support, and disciplinary activities necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; select and suspend subordinate commanders and staff officers; and convene courts martial. Goldwater-Nichols, 24-25; Other changes include giving CINCs the ability to request adjustment to their authority, assigned all military forces except those that support service functions, and increased the CINCs input to the operational requirements process. Service functions include: recruiting; organizing; supplying; equipping; training; servicing; mobilizing; demobilizing; administering; maintaining; construction; outfitting and repair of military equipment; and construction, maintenance, and repair of real property. Goldwater-Nichols, 23, 25, 46, 57, 56, 68, 49, 121; COCOM "cannot be delegated or transferred" and involves "organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning task, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish" the command's mission. JP 1-02, 104-05. JP 3-0, II-6; JP 3-0, II-11.

⁴² JP 3-0, II-8.

⁴³ A unified command may have assigned forces that are available for immediate use. However, the bulk of military forces are only assigned when a crisis occurs within a CINCs area of responsibility. Forces are identified by the NCA for CINC planning purposes in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The assigned forces are typically part of service components that provide "administrative and logistic support" for their respective units. JP 3-0, II-13.

⁴⁴ Using service components provides "clear and uncomplicated command lines" with the components keeping responsibility for logistics. JP 3-0, II-13; Functional components "provide centralized direction and control" of functions under a single commander to preserve unity of effort. JP 3-0, II-14.

⁴⁵ The issue over command of USSOUTHCOM is an example. Because Latin America militaries are primarily army based it is felt it better to have a U.S. Army officer in command of SOUTHCOM. Ronald H. Cole, et al., *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), 83; GEN Schwartzkopf's visits to Arab nations prior to the Gulf War is a very good example. As soon as it was announced that he was tagged for CINCCENT, GEN Schwartzkopf "signed up for an intensive course on the Middle East at the Foreign Service Institute." One can also go back to GEN Eisenhower's difficulties with Montgomery and how it was caught up in Allied politics. GEN H. Norman Schwartzkopf, with Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take A Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 273-85.

⁴⁶ It is also possible to establish a sub-unified command on a functional basis. This paper assumes sub-unified commands are geographical in nature. JP 3-0, II-5-7; OPCON is "the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing command and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission" this includes joint training. OPCON does not include "authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training" nor does it include the "authority to delineate functional responsibilities and geographic joint operations areas of subordinate" joint force commanders. JP 3-0, II-7, II-12.

⁴⁷ JP 3-0, II-12, JTFs can be established by the Secretary of Defense and commanders of sub-unified commands and existing JTFs.

⁴⁸ JP 3-0, II-13. In recent years JTFs were created for the Los Angeles riots and the Somalia humanitarian relief operations. Rosemary B. Mariner, "Operations Other Than War," *Joint Force Quarterly* 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994-95): 117-19.

⁴⁹ Robert D. Chelberg, with Jack W. Ellerston, and David H. Shelley, "EUCOM—At the Center of the Vortex," *Field Artillery* (October 1993): 14.

⁵⁰ Chelberg, et al., 14.

⁵¹ Chelberg, et al., 14; PACOM uses "deployable staff augmentation teams." These teams train and exercise with Joint Force Commanders on a regular basis. Paul David Miller, "A New Mission for Atlantic Command," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 1 (Summer 1993): 81.

⁵² Ralph W. Passarelli and Frank E. Schwamb, "Unified Endeavor '95 and Modeling Effective Training," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 12 (Summer 1996): 11-15; Clearance Todd Morgan, "Atlantic Command's Joint Training Program," *Joint Force Quarterly* 8 (Summer 1995): 120-21; Douglas A. MacGregor, *Breaking the Phalanx*, with forward by Donald Kagan (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 152.

⁵³ Sun Tzu, 109.

⁵⁴ Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 6.

⁵⁵ The principles of war represent the best efforts of military thinkers to identify those aspects of warfare that are universally true and relevant. The principles of war currently adopted by the Armed Forces of the United States are objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine. JEL CD-ROM, *Joint Encyclopedia (Draft)* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 598.; JP 1, III-1; "The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The objective of combat operations is the destruction of the enemy armed forces' capabilities and will to fight. The objective of an operation other than war might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective." JP 3-0, A-1; "The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort—coordination through cooperation and common interests—is an essential complement to unity of command." During the American Civil War the Union Navy and Army "cooperated" and achieved a high level of unity of effort, but never had unity of command below President Lincoln. This cooperation gave the Union an asynchronous advantage over the Confederacy; it allowed the Union to take advantage of the large coast line to seize Confederate ports and use them for future operations. Although it is fair to say the Union never to full advantage of this capability. JP 3-0, A-2; JTF staff officers must know their own

services capabilities and limitations and “those of non-DOD agencies and probable coalition partners.” These officers have to be experts in their own fields and “politically and culturally astute, fully understanding the broader implications of their actions,” Chelberg, et al., 16.

⁵⁶ “The authority that a commander in the Military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.” JP 1-02, 109-10; *Joint Encyclopedia (Draft)*, 160-61; “First, command must arrange and coordinate everything an army needs to exist—its food supply, its sanitary service, its system of military justice, and so on.” This part is called “function-related. Second, command enables the army to carry out its proper mission, which is to inflict the maximum amount of death and destruction on the enemy within the shortest possible period of time and at minimum loss to itself: to this part of command belong, for example, the gathering of intelligence and the planning and monitoring of operations.” Van Creveld calls this part “output-related. Van Creveld believes that “few other functions..... are as important in both respects, existence and operation. van Creveld, 5, 6.

⁵⁷ van Creveld, 262-63.

⁵⁸ van Creveld, *passim*; The passage describes the planning of the operation by XVIII Corps staff. The authors note that the “mutual trust [between the planners] was critical ...in the conception of the plan.” Thomas Donnelly, et al., *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 399.

⁵⁹ van Creveld, 265.

⁶⁰ van Creveld, 265.

⁶¹ van Creveld, 265, 267.

⁶² To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the commander’s intent. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to accomplish their intent and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.” *Joint Encyclopedia*, 161-62; The technical means gets much play in military journals, almost in the belief that technology is *the* answer to joint interoperability. This is due to the defense acquisition world where what one procures is the measure of goodness. This view in no way minimizes the need for communications “gear” and such like; The modern military staff traces its origins to the quartermaster created in the 17th century. Initially its responsibilities included searching for camp sites in advance of an army. This required some knowledge of mathematics and assisted by four officers. Over time the responsibilities grew to include gathering intelligence data. Van Creveld believes the slow development of the modern staff was due to the uncertainty of operations. Unlike more tangible aspects of war where creating rules and standards is feasible, operations themselves are too caught up in chance. Van Creveld, 10, 35-36, 40; The use of *orchestrate* is intentional and a better description of what should occur. Webster’s Dictionary defines orchestrate as “to arrange or combine to achieve a desired or maximum effect.” Compare this to JP 1-02’s definition of *synchronization*; “the arrangement of military actions in time, space, purpose to produce a maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.” This is almost the same as the definition for *orchestrate* rather than *synchronize*, which Webster’s defines as “the act or result of synchronizing” or “the state of being synchronous.” In turn, synchronous means “happening, existing, or arising at *precisely* the same time” [my emphasis]. Getting operations to happen at *precisely* the same time is a near impossibility and unnecessary. Even Clausewitz says as much

As all experienced soldiers will admit, it is difficult even from the tactical point of view to make a success of an attack in several separate columns by smoothly coordinating every part. How much more difficult, or rather, how impossible the same must be in strategy, where intervals are so much greater! If then the smooth coordination of all parts is a precondition of success, a strategic attack of that kind ought to be avoided altogether. But, on the one hand, one is never wholly free to reject it since it may be imposed by circumstances that one cannot alter; while, on the other, the smooth coordination of every

part of the action from start to finish is not even necessary in tactics, let alone strategy. From the strategic point of view, then, there is all the more reason to ignore it; and it is all the more important to insist every part be given an independent task.

It would also seem to be ungrammatical to use synchronous, a concept related to time, with space and purpose. *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 10th ed., s.v. "orchestrate", "synchronize", and "synchronous." Joint Publication 1-02, *Terms and Definitions* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 519. Clausewitz, 630

⁶³ JP 0-2, *Unified Action of the U.S. Armed Force* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), IV-14-15.

⁶⁴ The special staff includes officers and advisors such as administration, headquarters support, public affairs, chaplain, surgeon, judge advocate, and comptroller. Liaisons from the components will also be attached as needed. Components include air, land, Marines, sea, and special operations. JCS Publication 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), Figure IV-1.

⁶⁵ Logistics functions include supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, engineering, salvage, procurement, health services, mortuary affairs, communications system support, security assistance, host-nation support, and related logistic activities. JP 0-2, IV-14-15

⁶⁶ Anthony C. Zinni, Jack W. and Ellerston, Bob Allardice, "Scrapping the Napoleonic Staff Model, *Military Review* (July 1992): 83.

⁶⁷ James Donald Hittle, *The Military Staff Its History and Development* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1961), 9; Expertise in service doctrine is required as well according to the officers. EUCOM's experience suggests there is a big step going from service to joint commands. Chelberg, et al., 16; Jomini, 51.

⁶⁸ The creation of army battalions and regiments actually traces its origins to the Spanish *colunelas* created in 1505. This formation was comprised of 1000-1250 troops using a variety of weapons; pike, halberd, arquebus, and sword. It was divided into five companies and the first tactical formation "based upon a coherent theory of weapons employment since the Roman cohort." By 1535 the Spanish developed the *tercio* consisting of several *colunelas* with only arquebusiers and pikeman remaining in the latter. The *tercio* was a permanent formation, having a fixed command chain and could conduct independent military operations alone. The key change to naval warfare was the advent of the *galleon*. This new ship used sail for propulsion and cannon placed below deck. The combination improved lethality, speed, and range of actions. Up until the 16th century naval combat had been an adjunct to ground warfare; oar driven ships, like the *galley*, carried soldiers to fight enemy soldiers on opposing ships. The chief means of weapon was the ram on the front of the ship; this allowed one to 'close with the enemy' at which point the soldiers jumped over and 'destroyed him'. Gustavus called his infantry formation of 500 men a squadron. The French called it a battalion. Gustavus unique contribution was creation of a permanent echelon above battalion, the brigade. He built upon ideas from others, but was the first to fit "his innovations into a completely integrated system with its own set of unifying principles." Naval battles refined the changes from the previous century. Navies typically fought in groups of five using a "line" formation. Controlling this formation relied on rudimentary signal flags. The English instituted "Fighting Instructions" as a basic 'how to guide' for its ships captains. In a sense the naval "line" was akin to the Greek phalanx in terms of flexibility and the ability to command. Richard Earnest Dupuy and Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present*, Second Revised Edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 458-59, 460, 522; 526-27, 530, 531-32; Gustavus created the first "long-standing national army." He based this on a *cantonal* system where eligible males between 18 and 40 were registered by local clergy. Service duration was set a 20 years and typically one in ten males served. The army was supported by taxes and land allotments. This system produced an army of 40,000 men. However, operations outside of Sweden were conducted by an army made up of foreign mercenaries; the Swedish troops were kept as a strategic reserve. Supporting the army remained a severe limitation and "living off the land" was still regular practice. Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the 'Military Revolution' of the Seventeenth Century," *Makers of*

Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret, with the collaboration of Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 47-49.

⁶⁹ The division was introduced in France during the 18th century. It was a permanent structure that combined infantry and artillery in one unit. Napoleon divisions typically comprised infantry and artillery, at corps level cavalry was used for reconnaissance, with cavalry divisions and corps' being created. Dupuy and Dupuy, 736-37; James J. Schneider, "The Theory of Operational Art" (SAMS Theoretical Paper No., Command and General Staff College, 1988), 15.

⁷⁰ Schneider, 15.

⁷¹ Stephen E. Ambrose, *The Struggle for Vicksburg* (Harrisburg: Historical Times Inc., 1967; repr., Eastern Acorn Press, 1982), cited in syllabus and selected readings on the Vicksburg campaign, 1862-1863, AMSP Vicksburg Staff Ride, 1998, 53. *Ad hoc* nature of Confederate command and contribution to the battle's outcome was described by Dr. Ken Robertson during AMSP Vicksburg Staff Ride on 19 March 1998. The Union missed a golden opportunity to bag the entire Confederate force at this battle. If the Union had sent a division or two down the rail line to Edwards' station it could have flanked the Confederate forces, closing off the means of escape to Vicksburg. Although the Confederates could have retreated south, Vicksburg would have been defended with only two divisions. If a siege occurred at all, it would most likely would have been shorter than the 47 days the actual siege took. The missed opportunity is attributable to the lack of training of Union headquarters. Another source describes the Confederate loss to "sloppy staff work" in preparing Pemberton's command. Food and ammunition had not been placed at Edwards Station; this *scratch* army spent 15 May "inert." Delays were caused by Pemberton's inexperience and the "lack of faith" this induced in his subordinate commanders. No reconnaissance was done of the line of advance even though Pemberton was aware of the Union presence. Failure to concentrate his available force, fighting the forces he did have on hand piecemeal, and poor feel for the battle and where the real threat was. James R. Arnold, *Grant Wins the War: Decision at Vicksburg* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997), 145, 197.

⁷² JP 1-02, 82. "Campaigns and major operations can span a wide variety of situations, from quick-hitting, limited-objective operations to much more extensive requirements. JP 3-0, III-5-6; *Joint Encyclopedia*, 160-61; The process used by a joint staff is campaign planning process. Deliberate planning take about two years to complete because they require coordination with the NCA and Allies within the region. During an actual or potential military operation the command use crisis action planning procedures that use previously developed plans as a starting point. A "campaign plan embodies the combatant commander's strategic vision of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives." This also applies to subordinate sub-unified and joint task forces. The joint community uses either a deliberate or crisis action planning process to prepare operational plans. As it suggests the deliberate planning process is not timely usually taking two years to complete. It focuses on possible conflicts that might occur and is essentially used to get a rough cut on force deployment depending on the perceived threat. "It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), ix, II-19.

⁷³ Other examples include the creation of three commands in the Pacific and whether or not Gen. MacArthur "commanded" Adm. Halsey. By the end of the war the Pacific commands more closely resembled service pure organizations. While this situation did not affect the outcome it is partially responsible for the confusion at Leyte Gulf. Halsey chased the Japanese phantom fleet, a carrier with no planes, and endangered the landing at Leyte. In this case Halsey was following orders of Adm. Nimitz not Gen. MacArthur. Without knowing it the Japanese had exploited a seam between Nimitz' and MacArthur's commands. Cole, et al., 1, 11.

⁷⁴ The initial commands included: Far East Command, responsible for Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, the Marianas, and the Bonins; Pacific Command, responsible for Pacific area; Alaskan Command, responsible for Alaska and Aleutians; Northeast Command, responsible for Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland; Atlantic Fleet, comprised forces assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and responsible for Atlantic; Caribbean Command, responsible for

Panama and Antilles; European Command, responsible for Europe. Under early unified concepts the JCS exercised strategic direction of all armed forces. Cole, et al., 12-13.

⁷⁵ One can also draw the same conclusion examining the advent of the Macedonian phalanx. The Greek phalanx was an *ad hoc* organization while the Macedonian version was permanent. The battle of Chaeronea in 338 showed the Macedonian version was superior; it also gave King Philip control of Greece. van Creveld, 6, 29-30; Dupuy and Dupuy, 44-47.

⁷⁶ JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Other Than War*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), IV-1.

⁷⁷ Chelberg, et al., 15.

⁷⁸ Clausewitz, 122.

⁷⁹ Only Earnest Will, JTF GTMO, and Provide Promise lasted longer than a year. George Stewart, et al., *JTF Operations Since 1983* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1994), 1, 6.

⁸⁰ Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989), 109-10; Stewart, et al., 23; Ordering the operation was not as clear cut as popular accounts would have us believe. The operation could not be separated from the on-going Cold War with the Soviet Union and, in turn, its proxies; Cuba and Grenada. The more likely reason was the chance to eliminate a Marxist/Leninist regime, Soviet ally, and potential staging base in the Caribbean. Another reason had to do with national prestige. Vietnam and the Iran hostage crisis and failed rescue attempt were still fresh in America's national psyche. Grenada presented an opportunity for the U.S. to regain some stature after a decade's worth of perceived failures. To put the operation in a better light one must consider that the U.S. was going against international treaties and NATO allies interests. Interference in another country's affairs violated both U.N. Charter and the Organization of American States treaty. The request for help from the Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) did not completely compensate for the apparent breach. Also, as part of the British Commonwealth, Grenada fell within Britain's responsibility. Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was firmly against military action in Grenada. The Reagan Administration was risking a lot to regain a sense of national prestige. Adkin, 107, 112-13, 123.

⁸¹ The U.S. established LANTCOM on 1 December 1947 under Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANTFLT). Its mission was to defend the U.S. from attack through the Atlantic, "plan and prepare for general emergency, and support U.S. forces in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Northeast, and the Caribbean. Cole, et al., 13, 14; Adkin, 126; Stewart, et al., 24; Ronald H. Cole, *Operation Urgent Fury* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 15; Estimated enemy forces were 1000 to 1200 regulars, 2000 to 5000 militiamen, and 250 Cubans. Cole, *Urgent Fury*, 21.

⁸² Stewart, et al., 23.

⁸³ Cole, *Urgent Fury*, 19.

⁸⁴ The U.S. created USFORCARIB on 1 December 1981 with headquarters on Puerto Rico. Cole, et al., 73-74; LANTCOM had a sub-unified command, U.S. Forces Caribbean (USFORCARIB), that was responsible for Grenada. But it was not considered capable of handling the operation. The existing contingency plan was not implemented nor even discussed during a planning meeting on 22 October. Under 2360 USFORCARIB would control an airborne or air assault division, a carrier battle group, and a marine amphibious unit. The "on-scene" commander would be XVIII Airborne Corps commander. Adkin, 131-32; In 1987 GEN. Vessey, Chairman of the JCS at the time of the operation, said that USFORCARIB "would have been as useful as an extra tit on a warthog..... It would have been the worst choice for an operational headquarters." The general had visited FORCARIB before Urgent Fury and found it lacked organic forces and was too isolated. The onus still falls on LANTCOM for not preparing its sub-unified command. Cole, *Urgent Fury*, 77n152; Stewart, et al., 24-26, 29; Schwartzkopf, 255; Adkin, 127.

⁸⁵ The forces included: an amphibious squadron, a Marine battalion-sized amphibious unit, the 82d Airborne Division, the Army Rangers, some Navy SEAL teams, some Air Force fighter wing detachments, and AWACS, airlift, and refueling aircraft. Stewart, et al., 26; Adkin, 140, 162.

⁸⁶ Stewart, et al., 25; The operation cost U.S. forces 19 dead and 116 wounded. The Cuban's lost 25 killed and 59 wounded. The Grenadine's lost 45 killed and 358 wounded; 24 Grenadine civilians were killed. Cole, *Urgent Fury*, 6.

⁸⁷ Stewart, et al., et. al, 28-29; Adkin, 130-31, 162-66.

⁸⁸ Stewart, et al., 28-29; Barbados had infiltrated intelligence personnel on 17 October and had performed a surveillance flight as well. The U.S. military attaché reported all the information he received through channels; it apparently never made it to the operation's planners. Adkin, 130-31, 162-66.

⁸⁹ The communications problems became somewhat legendary and were frequently used as an example of what was broken in joint operations. Stewart, et al., 27.

⁹⁰ van Creveld, 271; Edward N. Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 238.

⁹¹ AC-130 gunships were available and provided needed firepower. Nevertheless these gunships could have been tasked to destroy the mechanized forces before they could react. Even better they could have attacked Ft. Frederick, the sector headquarters, the night before. Adkin, 183-86; Luttwak, 57.

⁹² Adkin, 127-28; Planning was further compounded by the close hold put on the operation; key expertise, such as logistics, was not included until the operation was underway. The record also suggests the JCS became involved in the weeds of planning; picking what forces would assault which target. This ignored the practice of mission type orders; telling subordinates *what* to do and not *how* to do it. Cole, *Urgent Fury*, 20-21; Internal planning between the forces themselves was also "broken." The 82d Airborne Division did not coordinate with the Army Rangers during planning even though it was to relieve them at Point Salines Airport on the first day; both were based at Fort Bragg. The 82d learned of the Rangers mission 24 hours before H-hour. Stewart, et al., 29; JULLS LLEDBO-00259, *Planning, Command, and Control of Operation Urgent Fury*, 29 Aug 89.

⁹³ In February 1979 Iran became an Islamic Republic and a sworn enemy of the *Great Satan*; the United States. In November of that year Iranian "students" invaded the U.S. Embassy in Tehran taking 62 Americans hostage. The Iranians soon released 13 black and/or female hostages. On 24 April the U.S. launched a rescue mission to Iran. The rescue was a *joint* operation that included personnel and equipment from each service. Unfortunately the loss of three helicopters to mechanical problems forced the mission to be aborted. Tragically eight service members were killed when a helicopter accidentally collided with a C-130 aircraft loaded with aviation fuel; the most probable cause of this accident was pilot fatigue. The lack of enough helicopters may have been due to poor planning; the plan failed to properly account for stress placed on man and machine. A JTF was used in this operation and was headquartered out of Egypt. It had an Army commander with an Air Force deputy. This incident as well as the loss of Iran itself dealt a severe blow to U.S. prestige. Dupuy and Dupuy, 1372; Luttwak, 44-45; Robert J. Earl, "A Matter of Principle," *Proceedings* Vol. 109/2/1960 (February 1983): 30-36; At the end of September 1982 the U.S. deployed forces to Lebanon as part of a multi-national peacekeeping force during that country's civil war. On 23 October 1983, two days before Urgent Fury began, 241 Marines were killed by a truck bomb driven into their barracks. Those in the chain of command were criticized and blame was placed on the local commander for poor security. Dupuy and Dupuy, 1365, 1366-67; Douglas C. Lovelass, Jr., *Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 5-15.

⁹⁴ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, 99th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 22-27.

⁹⁵ *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, 26; Poole, et al., 113-16.

⁹⁶ *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, 36, 41.

⁹⁷ Author's emphasis. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, 41.

⁹⁸ Goldwater-Nichols requires a qualifying joint duty assignment to be at least three years for flag officers and three and half for everyone else. This was changed to two and three years, respectively under Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces. The Secretary of Defense can waive the time. The Secretary must also designate 1000 positions as "joint critical" and only qualified JSOs can fill them. The act also requires that future combatant commanders must be JSOs. There is also a stipulation that all officers nominated for flag rank must have joint experience. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Conference Report 99-824, 24, 37, 43; In general the services have been successful in complying with these provisions. The services were averaging 5 years for joint tour length between 1991 and 1996. The main drawback is in making the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols compatible with service promotion and command selection policies. Lovelass, 54,56.

⁹⁹ Stewart, et al., 10-11.

¹⁰⁰ Stewart, et al., 11-12.

¹⁰¹ Only 23 Americans were killed. Stewart, et al., 76.

¹⁰² Before the invasion the winner of the May 1989 Panamanian presidential elections, Guillermo Endara was sworn in as President of Panama. However, he and his two vice presidents were unprepared to govern. Stewart, et al., 73-74; Donnelly, et al., 400-01; Exacerbating this was the lack of civil affairs experts available to SOUTHCOM. Most are army reservists and call-up requires Presidential approval; he would not do this for Just Cause and could not do it for BLIND LOGIC because it was unapproved. SOUTHCOM did not request a call-up of civil affairs units until 20 December. Stewart, et al., 74; A 600 civil-affairs troops were believed needed in Panama. Ronald H. Cole, *Operation Just Cause The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama February 1988-January 1990* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), 46.

¹⁰³ U.S. officials warned Noriega in 1985 about his monopoly on power and involvement with drug trafficking. U.S. relations with Panama began to deteriorate in 1987 over alleged involvement of drug trafficking by Manuel Noriega, the erstwhile leader of Panama. Diplomatic efforts to remove Noriega were unsuccessful and led to harassment of Americans based in Panama by the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF). American grand juries indicted Noriega on drug trafficking charges in 1988. In 1989 Noriega nullified the elections that he lost; the U.S. recognized the opposition as the legitimate government of Panama. Harassment of Americans in Panama continued through 1989 when on 16 December the PDF killed a U.S. Marine. Cole, *Just Cause*, 6; Stewart, et al., 67.

¹⁰³ The original concept was a single plan called Elaborate Maze. The CJCS asked CINCSOUTH to break it into four plans. The first, KLONDIKE KEY, would conduct a noncombatant evacuation of Panama; at this time there were approximately 35,000 U.S. citizens in Panama. The second plan, POST TIME, would defend U.S. citizens and installations, the Canal; the 193rd Infantry Brigade in Panama would constitute the bulk force for plan execution. The third plan, BLUE SPOON, would execute a "joint offensive operation" to destroy the PDF and protect U.S. citizens, property, and the Canal; estimated duration was three weeks. The last plan, BLIND LOGIC, would support restoring essential services and assist the new Panamanian government. Forces that would support these last two plans included a light infantry brigade, a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, a mechanized infantry battalion, and one carrier battle group; minus the carrier battle group the force was essentially a reinforced light division. BLIND LOGIC would use these forces except it would get a civil affairs brigade and lose the carrier battle group. JTF-Panama, based on USARSO, would control these operations. However, this would place a junior Major General in the chain over a more senior Major General. Disagreements between the Director of the Joint Staff and SOUTHCOM/J3 arose over command and control. SOUTHCOM/J3 believed JTF-Panama should plan and execute the BLUE SPOON. The Director believed the operation required a corps-sized headquarters and USARSO could only command in-country forces. The CINCSOUTH resolved the dispute temporarily; he realized that a corps headquarters was

needed if CONUS-based brigades were deployed. The corps was added to the TPFDD with the understanding that it would not become operational until the operation began. Cole, *Just Cause*, 7, 8-9; Stewart, et al., 69; John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 5-6, 7-15, 20-24, 41; The State Department excluded from the planning effort due to classification and close-hold restrictions. Liaison with State representatives and experts began after the plan was being executed. Stewart, et al., 10-11; Donnelly, et al., 55.

¹⁰⁴ Fishel, 41.

¹⁰⁵ Stewart, et al., 14-15.

¹⁰⁶ This may sound like whining by the higher echelon but consideration of the political nature of this operation will put it a different light. Stewart, et al., 100; JULLS 91560-01994, *Need for a Permanent Crisis Response JTF HQ*, submitted by G3 Plans, Unclassified

¹⁰⁷ JULLS 50752-92972, *Forming a JTF Headquarters During Operation*, submitted by MCCDC CALLP TM, Unclassified; JULLS 50752-82305, *Improving JTF Staff Performance Based on Res*, submitted by MCCDC CALLP TM, Unclassified

¹⁰⁸ JULLS LLEA0-02933, *USMC Transition of Joint Task Force Commanders Caused Problems (U)*, submitted by CG II Marine Expeditionary Force (CGIIMEF), Unclassified

¹⁰⁹ JULLS LLEA0-03627, *CJTF Not Involved in Development of Commander's Estimate/Courses of Action (U)*, submitted by Commander Joint Task Force 140, Unclassified

¹¹⁰ JULLS 12251-99659, *Manning the JTF with Joint Trained Personnel*, submitted by Joint Staff/J7, Unclassified

¹¹¹ By nature service components are not joint operations experts. There is no guarantee that they will have enough officers with joint experience, let alone fully qualified JSOs. Finally, experience in joint headquarters will be limited.

¹¹² A benign environment is one where there are no major conflicts going on. During the '80s the Cold War was "raging" but the Soviets did not take advantage of this; of course they were stuck in Afghanistan during most of the time.

¹¹³ From the Introduction to Archie Barret, *Reappraising Defense Organization: An analysis based on the defense organization study of 1977-1980* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1983), xxiii; cited in Luttwak, 266.

¹¹⁴ Zinni, 83.

¹¹⁵ Zinni, 85.

¹¹⁶ Zinni, 85.

¹¹⁷ Zinni, 85.

¹¹⁸ Zinni, 85-86.

¹¹⁹ Chelberg, et al., 13; Zinni, 85-86.

¹²⁰ Zinni, 87. Reservists can be used to add depth to the organization. The cadre would be enough to operate 24 hours per day using 12 hour shifts, adding trained reservists would allow 8 hour shifts. Issues of calling-up the reserves or guard personnel may have to be investigated.

¹²¹ Lawrence E. Casper, Irving L. Halter, Earl W. Powers, Paul J. Selva, Thomas W. Steffens, and T. Lamar Willis, "Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Security Strategy for the Next Century," *Joint Force Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 85, (cited as Casper henceforth).

¹²² FM 100-15, *Corps Operations*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 1-5-11.

¹²³ Even Clausewitz says supports this view:

So if armies do attack in different operational theaters, each should be given a distinct objective. What matters is that the armies everywhere expend their full energies, not that all should make proportionate gains.

In any case, seeing the large areas with which strategy is concerned, the commander-in-chief can properly be left to deal with the arguments and decisions that settle the geometric pattern of the parts, and so no subordinate has the right to ask what his neighbor is doing or failing to do. He can be told simply to carry out his orders. If serious dislocation should really result, the supreme command can still put it right. In this way the objection to separate operations is removed—that is, the obfuscation of realities by a cloud of fears and suppositions that seeps into the actual course of events, so that every mishap affects not just the part that suffers it but, contagiously, all the rest, and personal weakness and antipathies among subordinate commanders are given ample scope.

Beyond the differences between his time and ours the sentiment of the above passages can be applied to modern war. Independent tasks can be given to the different components that when achieved gain a strategic result.

¹²⁴ Stewart, et al., Table 1, 3; Casper, et al., 82.

¹²⁵ *Merriam Webster's Dictionary*, 10th ed., s.v. "train."

¹²⁶ Under educate the most applicable meaning is "to develop mentally, morally, or aesthetically." *Merriam Webster's Dictionary*, 10th ed., s.v. "educate" and "education."

¹²⁷ Army officers spend ten months at the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) primarily immersed in planning and conducting division and corps level operations. Officers may spend an additional year at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) increasing their knowledge as planners; Chelberg, et al., 16.

¹²⁸ At EUCOM, a Joint Warrior exercise for staff officer training occurs twice a year. Computer-assisted exercise is held once a year. Symposiums for general officer guidance/perspective is held every one or two years. Chelberg, et al., 15.

¹²⁹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, with a forward by B. H. Liddell Hart (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

¹³⁰ GEN. Holder says that "theater operations fall more clearly into the domain of art" and teaching operational art will resemble teaching "political science", because "each situation varies so strongly in personal, geographic, demographic, historical and economic details." L.D. Holder, "Educating and Training for Theater Warfare," *Military Review* (Jan/Feb 1997), Proquest reprint, 3;

¹³¹ Holder, 3, 5; J.F.C. Fuller, *The Conduct of War, 1789-1961* (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1961), 287-309; Prof. Jay Luvaas relates that Frederick the Great and Napoleon studied *men* and not maxims. They told their subordinates to view things from the enemy's perspective. Luvaas, 2-3..

¹³² Gregory D. Foster, "Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist," *Joint Force Quarterly* 11 (Spring 1996): 111.

¹³³ Carl H. Builder, "Keeping the Strategic Flame," *Joint Force Quarterly* 14 (Winter 1996-97): 78; Colin S. Gray, "On Strategic Performance," *Joint Force Quarterly* 10 (Winter 1995-96), 32-33, 34-35.

¹³⁴ Grant T. Hammond, "Paradoxes of War," *Joint Force Quarterly* 4 (Spring 1994): 9.

¹³⁵ James C. Hyde and Michael W. Everett, "JLASS: Educating Future Leaders in Strategic and Operational Art," *Joint Force Quarterly* 12 (Summer 1996): 29.

¹³⁶ Manuel De Landa, address to the School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth KS, 1 April 1998; In laymans terms "non-linear" systems have a greater output than input; a small shove goes a long way. Linear systems have a one to one relationship. For instance, if the input is doubled, the output is doubled. Non-linearity is inherent in "chaotic" systems; systems that depend on initial conditions (non-random), but do not repeat the same condition regularly (non-periodic). These concepts provide a closer representation of war's nature than linear systems. Strategic decision making and friction demonstrate aspects of these concepts. Because chaotic systems are sensitive to initial conditions, long-term future predictions are unreliable. Chaos theory can help design more realistic models and define a minimum set of variables the model needs. The resulting models can be used to check the accuracy of our own predictions, rather than make predictions. More importantly the model can assist use in identifying enemy centers of gravity, what Clausewitz called "the hub of all power." David Nicholls, and Todor D. Tagarev, "What Does Chaos Theory Mean for Warfare?" *Airpower Journal*, Vol. VIII, No. 3, (Fall 1994): 49, 53-55.

¹³⁷ Nicholls and Tagarev, 55-56.

¹³⁸ GEN. Powell says that JFCs "must keep in mind the overarching political purpose for military action and be aware of the use of the other instruments of national power." Colin L. Powell, "A Doctrinal Statement on Selected Joint Operational Concepts," 10 November 1992, 1, JEL CD-ROM May 1997.

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